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The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom 




The contemporary age appears beset and driven by moral and political disputes, disagreements, 
fundamental misunderstandings, and mutual incomprehension. Secularists and religious believers 
systematically argue past one another. Doctrinal differences across and within religious communities 
persist despite, in many cases, centuries of dialogue and debate. Many of these disputes are neither 
trivial nor banal, but go to the heart of some of the most enduring and fundamental political 
questions and concerns. Foremost among them is the question: how can we co-exist in a peaceful 
and harmonious manner that does not entail a wholesale renunciation of those constitutive beliefs 
and practices that make us who we are? How can we be and let be? The search for a sufficiently 
robust common ground is increasingly urgent and appears increasingly difficult to achieve at 
regional, national, and international levels. Some readers might balk at this particular characterization 
of the world “out there,” for some, a solution may appear readily at hand, requiring only sufficient 
political will and courage to be realized. On this view, the moral and legal doctrine of human rights 
provides the normative cement capable of overcoming conflict and holding the world together. For 
many advocates of human rights the doctrine and its core principles are neither partial nor 
contingent. Human rights, it is argued, address a global community of morally equal individuals. The 
right to life and the right to be free from torture are absolute and immutable. Simplifying a very 
complicated series of philosophical arguments, no rational individual, however powerful, is 
considered rationally capable of rejecting the universal application of such core principles. The 
doctrine of human rights is a necessary and sufficient means for resolving the phenomenon of moral 
and political conflict and offers a sustainable answer to the question of how we might live together 
despite our deep differences.  
Within the non-academic human rights community this is a position which is more often 
assumed than it is argued for: human rights have begun to be characterized, in some quarters, as a 
new religion, founded less upon reason and more upon faith (Rorty 1993; Ignatieff 2001). The 
extent to which this may be empirically accurate should cause deep concern for those whose support 
of the doctrine rests upon more sophisticated, intellectually robust but, hopefully, not unduly 
idealized foundations. However, I wish to focus upon a slightly different, though no less significant, 
aspect of contemporary analyses and understandings of human rights: the extent to which culture, in 
the anthropological sense, affects the development, understanding and implementation of human 
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rights principles. I pursue this by setting Chandran Kukathas’ recent book, The Liberal Archipelago, 
in a broader theoretical context, which is necessary for understanding and assessing his contribution 
to the political theory of human rights. My discussion considers the following questions: how do 
contemporary liberal political theorists conceive of the relationship between culture and the 
constitutive elements of a core political morality, which is thought to be capable of securing a 
normative consensus? Within this context, how does culture have an impact upon human rights? 
Finally, what is Kukathas’ political theory and does it present a means for securing political 
consensus that is supportive of and consistent with the most fundamental human rights principles? 
 
Contemporary Liberal Political Theory and Cultural Diversity 
Human rights theory owes its origins, and the greater part of its conceptual development, to 
liberalism. It would be simplistic and unduly reductivist to describe the two doctrines as 
synonymous and identical. However, the similarities and commonalities between them significantly 
outweigh the differences. This common heritage and trajectory is important to the extent that 
developments within and challenges to liberalism are likely to resonate within and have implications 
for human rights theory.  
The philosophical history of liberalism in the 20th century has been characterized, in part, by a 
recurring criticism. Liberal political theorists were accused by Marxists, Feminists and, most recently, 
Communitarians of either ignoring the cultural context of liberalism itself or of being constitutively 
incapable of assimilating an adequate and accurate understanding of culture as a consequence of the 
foundational elements and cornerstones of the doctrine. The precise terms of each of these critical 
perspectives differed as one would expect. However, their respective critiques did cohere around the 
conception of the individual, which liberals were generally accused of propagating. On this view, 
liberalism was criticized for being founded upon an empirically false conception of the individual. 
Liberals’ normative commitment to formal equality and negative liberty was presented as entailing an 
empirically false, absurdly abstracted conception of those individuals who were subject to the 
political authority of the liberal state. Individual citizens are not empty vessels but culturally 
endowed beings. Our commitments, beliefs and practices are informed, to varying degrees, by the 
cultural communities within which we developed and with which we associate. To the extent that 
culture can have such a profound effect upon the perspectives and self-understandings of those who 
populate liberal societies, culture is an ontological ground that liberals can no longer ignore.  
Some may wish to take issue with the significance attached to culture by the various critics of 
liberalism. Increasing numbers of contemporary liberal theorists have, however, come to accept the 
claim that for many people who are subject to the jurisdiction of the liberal state, cultural belonging 
is a primary good: an indispensable element of their particular sense of identity and well-being. 
Furthermore, forces such as migration and a resurgence of religious belief amongst indigenous and 
immigrant communities within liberal societies have increased the numbers of those for whom 
cultural belonging can be considered to be so important. The specter of the atomized and alienated 
individual unable to commit to anything, as well as finding meaning in nothing, is slowly being 
replaced by the vision of selves on a search for meaning and a cause to espouse. To some, this new 
vision appears to be too readily catered to by some religious and cultural communities. Culture and, 
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within that domain, religion have become central elements of the ongoing development of liberalism 
and the search for securing a normative consensus sufficient for justifying liberal political authority.  
While increasing numbers of liberal political theorists accept that culture and religion cannot be 
ignored, the precise terms of how liberals should respond differ significantly. At one end of the 
spectrum resides Brian Barry (2001) who insists that the moral legitimacy of liberalism entails not so 
much ignoring culture and religion but insisting that individuals be accorded due equal respect, 
recognition and legal protection irrespective of whether enforcing this principle may have adverse 
effects upon some religious and cultural communities subject to the jurisdiction of the liberal state. 
Barry, in effect, draws liberalism’s line in the sand at the principle of equal respect, refusing to 
countenance any compromise or negotiation with communities that do not share this ideal. At the 
other end of the spectrum, at least ostensibly, resides Will Kymlicka, who has been at the forefront 
of liberalism’s “culturalist turn.” While his account has shifted through numerous instantiations, 
Kymlicka has consistently argued that the formulation and implementation of liberal principles must 
adapt in order to take due regard of the importance of a sense of cultural belonging to some of 
those who populate liberal societies. For him the fact of cultural diversity entails that liberals can no 
longer simply assume the existence of some normative consensus built around a set of substantively 
liberal ideals and values. Liberals must refrain from an impulse to simply dismiss as false those 
ideals, values, and practices that do not conform to the liberal credo. He counsels a greater openness 
and receptiveness to illiberal communities in our midst. He does, ultimately, insist that the liberal 
state should not be supportive of communities whose practices entail a systematic violation of the 
autonomy of their adult members. For Kymlicka, culture is important but its value is instrumental to 
the protection and promotion of the exercise of personal autonomy. Other liberals contribute to this 
development and occupy varying positions along the culturalist spectrum. The work of Chandran 
Kukathas is very important in this regard and will be analyzed in detail after a consideration of how 
this development within liberalism may affect human rights theory. 
 
Culture and Human Rights Theory 
Like liberalism, the development of human rights theory has only recently come to adequately 
engage with the concept and empirical reality of culture as an ontological domain.1 The emergence 
of the so-called “third generation” of individuals’ rights to cultural goods testifies to this claim. 
Conceivable reasons for this development both overlap with and differ from those which serve to 
explain liberalism’s neglect of culture. In respect of the differences, it can be argued that the 
academic discourse and enterprise of human rights has been largely, though not entirely, dominated 
by the discipline of law. From this perspective, there has been a tendency to conceive of human 
rights principles in unduly formalized terms that correspond with relevant formal legal instruments. 
The academic discipline of law has long been criticized by some for its apparent neglect of the 
social, economic, and political factors that influence the development of specific laws and the 
institutions through which they are realized. This relative myopia for the context of law provides an 
explanation for why culture has not achieved the attention it warrants given the importance it holds 
for many of those subject to the law and human rights. In recent years the influence of academic 
                                                 
1 See Cowan, Dembour and Wilson (2001). 
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disciplines more sensitive to the cultural conditions of human action—such as sociology and 
anthropology—has increased within the academic study of human rights. This contribution has 
extended to affect the work of more established academic disciplines in the study of human rights 
such as political science and law. Through a gradual process of diffusion, culture and cultural 
belonging have become legitimate elements of the general academic discourse of human rights. To 
that extent, it marks a diminishment of law’s domination in the academic study of human rights and 
the necessary assimilation of phenomena central to our understanding of the basis for and 
application of human rights.  
The similarities between liberalism’s and human rights theory’s relative neglect of culture are, 
arguably, more significant since they go to the very heart of the substance of attempts to normatively 
justify human rights principles and the claims made on their behalf. One way of accounting for this 
is by reference to what I shall refer to as the “insider/outsider nexus.” Cultural belonging correlates 
with a range of varying forms of identity, which are internal to a particular cultural community and 
provide for recognizable and legitimate modes of being and action. Cultural diversity testifies to the 
existence of multiple forms of identity—multiple modes of being and action across a given society. 
Cultures may be distinguished from one another by a perception and maintenance of those modes 
of being and action that characterize a given culture and mark the borders between cultures. Within 
complex, heterogeneous societies all cultural communities are not self-enclosed, static and 
homogeneous entities. Very few, if any, can be described in such terms. However, recognition of 
cultural diversity entails recognition of cultural differences and distinctions. It also entails acceptance 
of the fact that cultural communities require a distinction between insiders and outsiders—those 
who belong and those who do not. How this distinction is maintained and enacted will differ from 
one culture to the next but it is essential to the reproduction of a cultural community. From this 
perspective and in this regard, all individuals simply cannot be viewed as being the same. The 
insider/outsider nexus is deeply problematic for the normative justification of human rights 
principles. 
Any attempt to assimilate the value of cultural belonging within the doctrine of human rights 
must first confront that which lies at the very heart of both the spirit and the letter of human rights. 
We, fellow human beings, possess human rights, if we possess them at all, not by virtue of our 
membership of some specifically privileged class or caste but by virtue of biological fraternity and 
the normative value accorded by the discourse of human rights. The discursive logic of human rights 
entails that the only legitimate answer to the question of who may be said to have a valid claim for 
the possession of human rights is each and every individual human being, irrespective of where they 
are from or which particular set of cultural values they may identify with. Moreover, each human 
being is deemed to have an equal claim to the possession of human rights regardless of his or her 
personal capital and achievements. Human rights claims are initiated in a vision of community that 
recognizes no ethically significant cultural or national distinctions. A commitment to the legitimacy 
of human rights does not entail turning a completely blind eye to the actual existence of such 
distinctions. However, it must entail a commitment to the view that these distinctions do not go “all 
the way down” to affect determining differential moral values of individuals whose cultures or 
nations differ. The doctrine of human rights thus emanates from a commitment to a form of 
abstract individualism and one cannot simply extract the latter without fundamentally affecting the 
philosophical credibility of the former. 
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Contemporary human rights theory would appear to be confronted by a particularly intractable 
problem. Culture and cultural belonging are increasingly accepted as sufficiently important for some 
people living within culturally diverse societies as to warrant some degree of recognition. Liberal 
states founded upon respect for human rights cannot simply refuse to accept that, for some people, 
maintenance of one’s culture and its constitutive practices and institutions is essential to their sense 
of well-being. Recent discussions of third generation cultural rights mark an acknowledgement of 
this and an attempt to respond to the challenge it presents. However, recognizing the importance of 
culture and cultural belonging raises a fundamental question of how “deep” this recognition may go. 
An enduring concern centers on whether such recognition can proceed without jeopardizing the 
basis of the principal justifications for human rights, which intentionally exclude any consideration 
of those facets that divide the universal moral community into separate and distinct cultural entities. 
Avoiding this outcome runs the corresponding risk of treating cultural belonging in an unduly trivial 
or superficial manner, thereby failing to appreciate the sheer importance some attach to maintaining 
the conditions for such belonging. Culture represents an important challenge to contemporary 
theory and application of human rights. Responses to this challenge are best described as “works in 
progress.” Indications as to how this might proceed can be gleaned from analyzing examples of how 
the challenge cannot be legitimately met. The recent work of Chandran Kukathas provides an 
important example in this regard. 
 
Kukathas and The Liberal Archipelago 
Kukathas would most likely not describe himself as a human rights theorist. However, his work 
is important to our understanding of human rights in a culturally diverse society or political system. 
He has long had an interest in the politics of cultural diversity and its implications for rights claims 
as the basis of political authority. The Liberal Archipelago represents a systematic formulation and 
expression of the political theory he has developed over the past two decades. Kukathas recognizes 
and accepts, along with the likes of Will Kymlicka, the empirical fact of cultural diversity. He accepts 
that political theorists must no longer assume the existence of culturally homogenous societies, nor 
assume that those who populate such societies continue to share a common outlook and a 
commitment to a set of fundamental and substantive ideals. He distinguishes himself from the work 
of Kymlicka, however, by claiming to draw the appropriate conclusions from this recognition. 
Kymlicka has consistently advocated the continuing prioritization of the substantive ideal of 
personal autonomy as providing the necessary normative foundation for political authority under 
conditions of cultural diversity. Kukathas argues that autonomy is no longer capable of enjoying the 
degree of normative consensus in many contemporary societies as a consequence of the existence of 
cultural communities that do not recognize the value of the ideal. These communities fall under the 
jurisdiction of the same political authority as those which espouse the ideal. He argues that securing 
a basic, though minimal, normative consensus under these conditions cannot be achieved by 
pursuing a policy of assimilation or enforced conformity to previously totemic liberal ideals, such as 
personal autonomy. Taking cultural diversity genuinely seriously entails an account of political 
authority that is not enthralled by the norms and values of any particular community which falls 
under its jurisdiction. Kukathas argues that his account raises and addresses a distinctly different 
question to that typically found within contemporary political theory. Where his more conventional 
counterparts are concerned with identifying what political authority ought to do, he is concerned with 
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identifying who ought to have authority (4). This distinction is important to the extent that the focus 
will necessarily shift away from which ideals, interests, and values ought to be promoted, to a 
concern for who has authority. 
A concern for who possesses political authority has a long heritage in political theory, stretching 
back at least as far as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Unlike his illustrious predecessors, Kukathas 
is not concerned to identify a single, personal source of political power which reigns over the 
populace. His position conforms to the contemporary spirit of human rights in so far as he aims to 
identify both the limits to the exercise of political power and to establish the individual agent as 
possessing an ultimate and ineliminable moral status within this context. Rights, then, occupy a 
central place within Kukathas’ theory. The basis and delineation of these rights, however, are subject 
to the startling premise that contemporary, culturally diverse societies are incapable of yielding a 
common, substantively normative foundation for political authority. Kukathas eschews, therefore, 
others’ appeal to the implementation of cultural or group rights as incapable of enjoying sufficient 
consensus. The fact of cultural diversity, he argues, speaks against, rather than in favor of group 
rights claims (259). In contrast, Kukathas draws upon the long-standing heritage of rights discourse 
in his identification of the individual as the only legitimate bearer of rights. Recognizing the fact of 
cultural diversity entails, for Kukathas, a return to the individual. However, the extent of cultural 
diversity excludes the legitimacy of valorizing substantive accounts of the individual and the 
promotion of extensive categories of rights to which the individual is entitled in order to realize her 
essence or presumed telos. In promoting the individual as the bearer of rights one must not return to 
those accounts of political authority which seek to protect and promote certain substantive ideals, 
values or conceptions of the person. Kukathas’ account of the individual, one might say, is far more 
pluralistic or eclectic than political theorists typically espouse. This is expressed, most importantly, in 
his formulation of the actual rights to which individuals may lay claim within a society whose 
political authority refrains from prioritizing certain ideals.  
Ultimately, Kukathas founds his political theory upon the individual’s right to freedom of 
association and its correlate, the freedom of dissociation (or, right of exit). He argues, “[A] good 
society is thus one in which individuals are free to associate with, and dissociate from whomever 
they wish, since dissent from the views of the majority or the powerful is tolerated, and conformity 
is not compelled” (76). Cultural diversity is thereby not reduced to the lowest common denominator 
of a collection of homogenous, integral cultural communities that may be said to contain their 
individual members. Personal identity, he accepts, can have a cultural context but is not ultimately 
reducible to a set of specific cultural constituents. Unlike, for example, Michael Sandel (1982), 
Kukathas’ recognition of the role of culture in identity formation rejects a view of culture as wholly 
constitutive of individual identity. After all, within culturally diverse societies most of us are going to 
be exposed to a variety of different cultural influences to such an extent that the claims of our 
“own” culture are bound to be diluted or constrained to a certain extent. It is also vitally important 
for Kukathas that recognition of cultural diversity not include a claim that these communities need 
to be normatively liberal in their outlook. He insists that a political theory adequate to the task of 
legitimately regulating culturally diverse societies must be based upon the ideal of toleration which, 
he argues, is secured by maintaining individuals’ right of freedom of association. Cultural 
communities are to be tolerated, therefore, not because they share “our” outlook but so long as they 
do not seek to impede individual members’ right of exit from any particular cultural community (97). 
This would be intolerable to the extent that it violated this fundamental right. 
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Kukathas, then, presents a political theory that seeks to retain a foundation in rights or, better 
expressed, a single right. The fact of cultural diversity does not, therefore, contradict or challenge the 
legitimacy of basing political authority upon a rights foundation. However, its effects are significant 
in the paring down of the fundamental rights Kukathas presents. Ultimately, he appears to accept 
the legitimacy of the one, single right to freedom of association. Upholding this right, he appears to 
assume, will be sufficient to protect against cultural incursions upon those diverse categories or 
collections of “goods” and values individuals hold to be important to them. The final arbiter on this 
issue is, therefore, the individual who chooses to either stay or go. So long as this choice is not 
impeded, political authority may be considered satisfactorily legitimate under conditions of cultural 
diversity. Kukathas insists that political authority must remain “indifferent” to substantive questions 
of the assumed necessary constituents of a “good life.” Political authority must not concern itself 
with issues and disputes over notions of identity, human flourishing or well-being. Rather, “[I]ts only 
concern ought to be with upholding the framework of law within which individuals and groups can 
function peacefully” (249). For Kukathas no single group or community can legitimately wholly 
possess political authority. Political authority is diffused across the various communities which 
together form not a single, homogeneous political entity, but an archipelago of co-existing 
authorities united by a commitment to maintaining the right of freedom of association.  
 
The Cultural Politics of Human Rights 
A commitment to human rights entails a commitment to the claim that there exists a single, 
global moral community of human beings. Beyond cultural, religious, ethnic, and national 
differences a normative realm is envisaged in which all enjoy a basic and equal moral recognition in 
the eyes of one another and in the eyes of those who hold and wield power. At this level what I 
referred to earlier as the insider/outsider nexus can have no real significance. The growing appeal of 
human rights to countless people across the globe reveals that this vision is not the preserve of 
ivory-tower dwelling philosophers and political theorists. However, the doctrine of human rights is 
confronted by the fact of cultural diversity, which, in some respects, constitutes a challenge to this 
vision of a single global family. Kukathas’ work is important in this respect.  
Cultural diversity must be accepted as an empirical reality which imposes certain constraints or 
limitations upon the scope and content of our fundamental normative values and ideals. However, 
the model espoused by Kukathas suffers from a significant degree of political naïveté. It may or may 
not be desirable to seek to establish a political ethics capable of securing the consent of all the 
relevant constituent cultural communities but, before one can embark on any such project, one must 
adequately gauge the extent to which different cultures and cultural differences are deeply affected 
by politics and the possession and exercise of political capital. Not all cultures enjoy equal standing 
and thus the individual members of any particular culture (whom Kukathas is primarily concerned 
about) may lead disadvantaged lives as a consequence of their cultural membership. Recognizing the 
cultural or national basis of identity and those rights that ensue entails an acceptance of the 
correlative necessity of exclusion of some based not upon the discovery of purportedly natural 
attributes but upon the imposition of politically motivated criteria.  
Underlying all of this is, however, a deeper and more troubling question: are human rights 
sufficiently morally compelling in an environment in which culture has become deeply political, and 
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in which the politics of cultural difference potentially threatens deep division and conflict? In the 
face of potential division and deep misunderstanding, is it not reasonable to seek to both identify 
and withdraw to some common ground, no matter how formalistic this may be? And, if one accepts 
this position, is it not at least credible to identify, in effect, an individual’s right to exit as that which 
political authority must uphold? Not to uphold this right would, after all, serve to confine individuals 
within cultural communities to which they were born and only add to cultural retrenchment and the 
potential for conflict. Such a vision is liable to appear more appealing the greater the prospect of 
cultural division and conflict. However, it cannot perform the task required of it. Politics occurs not 
simply between cultures but within them also. Kukathas suggests that the capacity to exit from a 
cultural community, which an individual may experience as oppressive, is always retained so long as 
it is legally upheld and protected. This is, of course, nonsense. Any given individual’s ability to exit 
from a cultural community within which their identity may have been formed is a measure of the 
individual’s possession of the requisite resources for beginning a genuinely new life and a measure of 
the willingness of others to accept this former outsider. Some women, in particular, may find this 
very difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Simply upholding a formal right to exit will not be 
sufficient to secure the effective exercise of the right. One’s possession of rights may not be 
determined by one’s cultural or national affiliations. However, the actual capacity to exercise such 
rights, particularly the right to exit, is deeply affected by one’s identity and cultural status. 
Confronted by the internal and external planes of cultural politics, how should an advocate of 
human rights proceed?  
 
No Escape from Culture 
The ideological cleavages of the Cold War have been replaced by a new form of political 
conflict, revolving around a set of religious and cultural divisions and mutual incomprehension. 
Defenders of human rights must not turn a blind eye to this empirical reality. Nor should it be 
dismissed as a mere epiphenomenon or temporary deviation from humanity’s striving towards those 
truly cosmopolitan ideals which, if realized, would genuinely secure a new world order founded 
upon peace and mutual respect. The world is not well served by such naïveté. However, human 
rights do exist and are accepted by countless millions of people across the globe. Beyond the 
narrowly legal sphere of their application, part of the enduring value of human rights consists in 
their embodiment of a spirit (for want of a better, less Hegelian term) of openness and acceptance of 
oneself and of others.  
Imagine, if you will, a vision of human society as consisting solely of self-enclosed, homogenous 
cultural or religious communities which, though aware of the different normative values and ideals 
of other communities, seek only to shut themselves off from these by means of ever more rigorous 
forms of “border control.” In this context, security is perceived as requiring the exclusion or close 
scrutiny of all those who do not share “our” commitments and outlook. The identification of 
“insiders” and “outsiders” would, one may confidently assume, become a central concern for each 
and any such community. For some this vision bears an ever increasing similarity to the post 9/11 
United States, the hegemonic Western power. Perhaps to a lesser degree, it is also a vision which 
underlies the concept of a “fortress Europe” in which non-Europeans are, at times and in places, 
seen as illegitimate intruders. A reversion to “culture” and “religion,” while most certainly not an 
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exclusively “Oriental” phenomenon, appears only to undermine a substantive basis for human 
solidarity and mutual concern. To this extent, Kukathas’ vision of political society might appear to 
draw the correct conclusions. The principal value of human rights in the contemporary world 
consists in its providing and representing a counter-point to this trend. 
The contemporary importance of other peoples’ cultural and religious commitments must, then, 
be accepted and responded to by the human rights community generally—theorists and practitioners 
alike. However, this response will be deeply undermined if developed from a position of a persistent 
ignorance or denial of the extent to which the human rights discourse has been fundamentally 
informed by a shifting and highly complicated collection of cultural and religious factors. The appeal 
of human rights is both undeniably global and cosmopolitan. Realizing this appeal requires not the 
persistence of a form of cultural myopia but a recognition and acceptance of the extent to which 
these principles themselves emerge out of a complicated amalgam of cultural and historical forms, 
not all of which are exclusively Western in character. Human rights provide a highly fluid and 
“unstable” world with a framework for inter- and intra-cultural dialogue. Inevitably, taking cultural 
differences seriously will entail a critical scrutiny of what counts as a “genuine” human right. One 
would expect, and hope, however, that the doctrine which emerged from such a scrutiny contained 
significantly more substance that that envisaged by Kukathas’ vision of political society.  
The process itself should also be informed by recognition of the fact that there is no escape 
from the conditioning forces of culture and society. All too often secular “enlightenment” advocates 
of human rights have been blind to the presence of such forces in their own forms of reasoning and 
moral commitments, dismissing opponents as laboring under the yoke of culture and religion from 
which, it is assumed, they are themselves immune. However, this process must not fetishize culture 
and society. Appeals to the nation and the people as a means for excluding “outsiders” almost 
always obscure the fact that any such entity is a human construction and not a natural phenomenon. 
They emerge from choices and decisions made, typically, by power-holders. Human rights provide a 
lever for a far more extensive participation in these processes. They provide a means for challenging 
those who claim to speak in “our” name. They provide a means for a far more comprehensive 
account of who “we” are. There is no escape from culture but the conclusions that have all too 
often been drawn from this claim must and can be countered. An appeal to human rights is an 
excellent place to begin.  
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